TEHRAN- Months before the onset of the US-Israel war against Iran, Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran's last Shah, undertook a visit to the occupied territories. During this trip, he held meetings with Benjamin Netanyahu, senior Mossad officials, and several influential Knesset members.

According to accounts published in various media outlets, an assessment was conveyed to the Israeli side during these meetings suggesting that, in the event of a military operation against Iran, initial pressures could catalyze widespread domestic protests and ultimately lead to the collapse of the Islamic Republic. 

Based on these same accounts, relying on such an estimation, Mossad formulated a "regime change" scenario alongside the military option and presented it to US President Donald Trump. Some Israeli analysts and US officials have revealed that Benjamin Netanyahu had previously proposed this same scenario to former American presidents, but they had declined to endorse such a plan.

Apparently, either due to inexperience in the world of politics, or due to optimism, or due to his deal-making disposition, Trump was deceived by Netanyahu and entered into an endless campaign with Iran. But their calculations were wrong, and they failed. 

The trajectory of developments on the ground proved contrary to these initial projections. The scenario's architects' expectation of widespread uprisings and the swift disintegration of Iran's political structure failed to materialize. On the contrary, many observers contend that external attacks actually bolstered national solidarity across various segments of Iranian society, prompting a significant portion of public opinion notwithstanding internal political divergences to rally in support of the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity against external threats.

Dadi the first domino

In the wake of this failed assessment, speculation regarding an intelligence failure within Mossad intensified. David "Dadi" Barnea, who had led Mossad since June 2021, stepped down from his post in June 2026 after completing a five-year term, with Roman Gofman named as his successor. Although official Israeli sources characterized the end of Barnea's tenure as part of the organization's standard leadership rotation, certain Israeli media outlets linked this development to the outcomes of operations against Iran and flawed intelligence evaluations.

The leadership changes within Mossad were not confined to the replacement of its director. Israel's Channel 12 reported that Roman Gofman, the new Mossad chief, in his initial moves, dismissed the organization's deputy director and another senior intelligence official. The outlet claimed these changes followed the failure of efforts to achieve Israel's strategic objectives concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran.

According to this report, the dismissed deputy director, identified only by the initial "A.," had been regarded as a primary candidate to succeed Barnea. In contrast, Benjamin Netanyahu's office, while confirming the management changes, stated that these decisions were made within the framework of the new Mossad director's plan to establish a fresh management team and prepare the organization's structure to meet the security challenges of the coming years.

In recent weeks, the publication of interviews with former Mossad officials has also revived debate within Israeli media and security circles concerning the role of psychological operations, cognitive warfare, and efforts to influence Iranian public opinion. In these interviews, it has been claimed that over the past years, in addition to intelligence and military operations, Mossad made extensive investments in media warfare and influence operations aimed at driving a wedge between Iranian society and the state.

Nevertheless, the outcome of these developments demonstrated that many of the initial assessments regarding Iranian society's response were incongruent with on-the-ground realities a matter now discussed by some Israeli analysts as one of Tel Aviv's most significant miscalculations and intelligence errors concerning Iran, although official Israeli authorities have not formally confirmed such an interpretation to date.

Mossad's strategy under fresh scrutiny 

The departure of Barnea and the restructuring of Mossad have reignited debate over one of the most controversial aspects of the recent conflict with Iran: whether Israeli intelligence expected military pressure and psychological operations to trigger political change inside the Islamic Republic.

An interview published in the Israeli media with the former head of a previously undisclosed Mossad influence operations branch has provided a rare glimpse into the agency's thinking during the years leading up to the conflict. While many of the interview's assertions cannot be independently verified, the account sheds light on the importance Mossad allegedly attached to information warfare, social media campaigns and efforts to undermine confidence in Iran's governing institutions.

According to the interview, Mossad established a dedicated influence operations branch in 2021 as part of a broad organizational reform introduced after Barnea assumed leadership of the agency. The official interviewed claimed that the new department was tasked with developing non-military methods to influence public opinion in Iran and Lebanon, combining intelligence analysis with media operations, online networks, and psychological warfare.

The interview further alleged that Mossad gradually shifted from relying primarily on covert kinetic operations toward integrating influence campaigns designed to weaken confidence in Iranian institutions. Among the methods described were the use of social media networks, fictitious online accounts, AI-generated influencers and carefully timed publication of sensitive information concerning Iranian officials.

Perhaps the most significant claim concerns Mossad's expectations before Israel's military campaign against Iran. According to the interview, the agency believed that combining military strikes with sustained influence operations could widen the gap between the Iranian government and segments of society, eventually encouraging broader political unrest. The interview also asserted that this assessment formed part of discussions with senior Israeli and American decision-makers before military operations commenced.

The same interview acknowledged, however, that these expectations were not realized during the conflict. While the former official argued that influence campaigns require months or even years to produce political effects, he conceded that the Iranian political system remained in place after the fighting ended.

The material provided for this report argues that Israeli planners expected military operations to coincide with widespread domestic unrest capable of fundamentally altering Iran's political landscape. It further stated that these expectations proved inaccurate, as public support for national sovereignty outweighed political divisions during the conflict. 

The Israeli interview itself appears to acknowledge that intelligence expectations evolved over time. The former official suggested that Mossad believed public dissatisfaction, economic pressures and sustained information campaigns would gradually weaken the Iranian government. He nevertheless admitted that political change did not occur during the military confrontation itself and argued that influence operations should instead be judged over a much longer period.

Leadership changes inside Mossad have further fueled discussion regarding the agency's performance. Following Barnea's departure in June 2026, Roman Gofman assumed leadership of the organization. According to reports cited in the source material, the new director subsequently replaced additional senior officials as part of a broader restructuring of the intelligence service. Israeli officials described those personnel changes as part of an organizational renewal rather than explicitly linking them to any single operation or intelligence assessment.

Taken together, the available material illustrates the growing importance intelligence agencies attach to influence operations alongside traditional espionage and military activities. Whether such campaigns can meaningfully shape political developments inside rival states remains the subject of continuing debate among intelligence professionals and security analysts.

What appears less disputed is that modern intelligence competition increasingly extends beyond espionage into cyberspace, social media, artificial intelligence, and information operations. The interview offers an unusual public account of how one former senior intelligence official believes those tools were developed and employed against Iran. 

Taken together, the available material illustrates the growing importance intelligence agencies attach to influence operations alongside traditional espionage and military activities. Whether such campaigns can meaningfully shape political developments inside rival states remains the subject of continuing debate among intelligence professionals and security analysts.

What appears less disputed is that modern intelligence competition increasingly extends beyond espionage into cyberspace, social media, artificial intelligence, and information operations.